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ABSTRACT
Conventional magazines for mass explosion hazard (hazard division 1.1) are constructed using bricks and 
reinforced cement concrete. For such magazines, magazine inter separation distance or storage inside quantity 
distance (SIQD) is 2.4 W1/3 m, where W is net explosive content in kg. New composite material called laced 
reinforced concrete (LRC) has been developed recently, for which the SIQD has been reduced upto 0.5 W1/3 m. 
Due to substantial reduction in inter magazine separation distances, the requirement of storage land area has been 
reduced significantly. Although SIQD has been reduced drastically due to development of the new composite LRC, 
the other quantity distances like process inside quantity distance (PIQD) and outside quantity distance (OQD) 
reduced marginally. To reduce these quantity distances, one solution is multi-compartmented structures based on 
Unit Risk Principle. The application of unit risk principle enables the separation of explosives into compartments in 
such a manner that initiation of explosives in one compartment does not result in initiation of explosives in adjacent 
compartments. This is achieved by special design of explosive storage buildings incorporating blast non-propagation 
wall between adjacent compartments storing explosives. Quantity distances are reduced for such magazines because 
maximum credible limit corresponds to the quantity of explosive in one compartment. Present paper describes 
design and full scale testing of blast non-propagation wall to be constructed between two adjacent compartments 
of a multi-compartmented explosive storage structure with storage capacity of 5 T net explosive content of HD 1.1 
per compartment. The blast non-propagation wall comprising of sand filling and air gap between LRC walls has 
been designed for desired attenuation of blast parameters as well as for arresting high velocity fragments/debris. 
The design has been validated by fully instrumented design validation field trial. The conduct of the trial as well 
as the trial results one discussed.
Keywords: Hazard divisions; Quantity distances; URP; Laced reinforcement concrete, LRC; Blast non-propagation 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Orange Book issued by United Nations contains 
the detailed classification of dangerous goods. As per this 
classification, the dangerous goods are classified into 9 classes 
(1 - 9), out of which class 1 comprises of explosive substances 
and articles. Class 1 is further divided into 6 hazard divisions 
(HDs). The first hazard division, HD 1.1 comprises of mass 
explosion hazard1. 
1.1 Principles of Quantity Distances
Potential explosion sites which permit explosives are a 
potential risk to individuals and property. Such sites should be 
located sufficiently clear of other buildings, stacks, vehicles 
or places frequented by persons so as to ensure the minimum 
reasonably practicable risk to life and property. This distance 
usually depends on the maximum net explosive quantity 
permitted at the potential explosion site and is therefore called 
the quantity distance (Q-D). Quantity distances are of four 
kinds; storage inside quantity distances (SIQD), process inside 
quantity distance (PIQD), public traffic route distances (PTRD) 
and outside quantity distances (OQD)1,2. The QDs are based on 
series of trials and analysis of trial results and all available data 
on accidental explosion in different countries. All QDs for HD 
1.1 class of explosive except OQD are function of overpressure, 
however OQD is a function of both overpressure and number 
density of lethal fragments (number of lethal fragments per 
unit area). A fragment is called lethal if its kinetic energy is 79 
J or more3,4. 
1.2 Construction of Explosive Storage Structures
Conventional explosive storage buildings are constructed 
using bricks and reinforced cement concrete (RCC)5,6. Scaled 
distances and overpressure values at various QDs for such high 
explosive magazines are as given in Table 1.
It is desired to design and develop such explosive storage 
buildings which require lesser quantity distances and therefore 
lesser land area. 
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1.3 Development of Laced Reinforcement Concrete
In laced reinforcement concrete (LRC), two layers of 
reinforcement and core concrete are tied together by truss 
action of continuous bent shear lacing. The arrangement of 
reinforcement bars and truss members (lacing elements) is as 
shown in Fig. 1.
Compared to conventional RCC, LRC technique is 
very useful for blast resistant structures subjected to close-in 
detonations. LRC structural elements exhibit larger ductility/ 
energy absorption and excellent concrete confinement8-10. 
delay between two explosions is sufficiently large, the effects 
of the two detonations do not superimpose/coalesce, otherwise 
due to coalition of the two effects, the damage increases 
exponentially. If this induced detonation takes place after 
a critical period so that superposition of positive phases of 
two blast waves does not take place, then it is called delayed 
detonation11. The superposition of positive phases of two blast 
waves is as shown in Fig. 2. 
The blast non-propagation wall between two compartments 
of a multi-compartmented explosive storage building having a 
storage capacity of 5 T NEC HD 1.1 per compartment has been 
designed and tested. The possibility of delayed detonation has 
been taken into account. This specially designed blast non-
propagation wall comprises of a series of LRC panels separated 
by sand-filling and air gap. 
2. DESIGN OF BLAST NON-PROPAGATION 
WALL
2.1 Blast-Wave Phenomena
Sudden release of energy is called an explosion. Due to 
the sudden release of energy, a disturbance (pressure front) 
is generated which propagates in the outside material 
medium. This disturbance or shock front while travelling 
in the surrounding atmosphere is called blast wave and 
is characterised by an instantaneous rise in pressure 
with respect to ambient. The peak value of overpressure 
associated with a blast wave is called peak incident 
pressure and is denoted by soP 9,10,12-14. An ideal pressure 
profile with respect to time of a blast wave can be as 
shown in Fig. 3.
2.2 Estimation of Blast Loading Parameters for 
Surface Burst
Detonation of a charge located on or very near to the 
ground surface is considered to be a surface blast. The variation 
of positive phase pressure, impulse, duration, negative phase 
pressure, time of arrival and other blast parameters with scaled 
distance for both surface and air blast have been plotted by 
DoD, uSA9,10. The scaled distance (Z) is mathematically 
defined as the ratio of standoff distance (R) to the cubic root 
Table 1. Scaled distances and overpressure values for Q-Ds1,3,7
Quantity 
distances 
Scaled distances
(m/kg1/3)
Overpressure
(bar)
SIQD 2.4 1.81
PIQD 8.0 0.21
PTRD 14.8 0.09
OQD 22.2 0.05
Figure 1. Reinforcement details of a LRC slab.
Figure 2. Superposition of positive phase of two blast waves.
1.3.1 Development of Structures-based on Unit Risk 
Principle
The application of unit risk principle enables the separation 
of explosives into compartments in such a manner that initiation 
of explosives in one compartment does not result in initiation 
of the explosives in adjacent compartments. This is achieved 
by special design of the storage buildings incorporating blast 
non-propagation walls between adjacent compartments storing 
explosives. All quantity distances are reduced and correspond to 
the quantity of explosive in one compartment called maximum 
credible limit. Reduction in QDs due to reduction in maximum 
credible limit for a 10 compartmented storage structure with 
per compartment storage capacity of 5 T NEC HD 1.1 as per 
QD table1 can be as shown in the following Table 2.
Table 2 . Difference in Q-Ds for a multi-compartmented and a 
non-compartmented structure
Type of structure SIQD (m)
PIQD
(m)
OQD
(m)
Non-compartmented structure of 50T 
NEC Capacity
89 295 820
10-Compartmented structure of 5T 
NEC capacity per compartment
41 140 380
In case of multiple explosions i.e. explosions in different 
compartments of the explosive storage structure, if the time 
LOngITuDInAL fLexuRAL ReInfORCeMenT
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of net explosive weight (W) in terms of TNT or its equivalent 
(Z=R/W1/3)9,10,13-16,20.
   
2.3 Estimation of Blast Loading Parameters for 
Confined Explosion
When an explosion takes place inside a structure, the peak 
value of blast overpressure associated with the initial shock 
front is extremely high. This blast overpressure is further 
amplified by its reflections from various reflecting surfaces like 
walls, floor and roof of the structure. The maximum number 
of reflecting surfaces in a fully confined cubicle can be four. 
Due to increase in the overpressure and duration of load, the 
impulse also increases. An approximate method for calculation 
of the internal blast pressures and impulses has been developed 
by DoD, uSA using theoretical method. This method is based 
on semi-empirical blast data and the results of response tests 
on slabs. 
2.4 Attenuation of Blast in Air
Attenuation of blast in an air gap can be calculated using 
following sequential steps.
(i) Scaled distances of the two extremes are determined
(ii) Scaled blast impulses are estimated for both scaled 
distances using figure 2-15 of ref 10 
(iii) Absolute blast impulses are determined
(iv) Difference in absolute blast impulses gives the attenuation 
of blast impulse in air gap.
These steps are as shown in the Fig. 4.
are generally used as blast non-propagation wall which 
does not allow the blast to propagate from one stack of 
explosive to other stack of explosive kept on either sides 
of the wall. Hence, construction of blast non-propagation 
wall comprising of composite walls is a solution to prevent 
sympathetic detonation.  Apart from blast attenuation 
capability, the composite walls are very good fragment 
arrester9,10,21. 
A composite wall comprising of two LRC panels 
separated by sand filling is as shown in the fig. 5. A 
blast load having impulse I is incident on this composite 
wall. If the residual impulse I'  will be transmitted to the 
surrounding, then blast impulse attenuated in the composite 
wall equals DI =I-I'. DI is called the blast impulse capacity of 
the composite wall.  Blast impulse capacity of composite wall 
is calculated as mentioned above. For design of a composite 
wall to be acceptable, its blast impulse capacity should be 
greater than the impulse of the incident blast load.
Figure 3. Blast wave profile 9,10,12,15-19.
Figure 5. Attenuation of blast impulse in a composite element.
2.5 Blast Attenuating Composite wall
Composite walls consist of two concrete panels filled 
with sand in between. The concrete panels may be made of 
reinforced cement concrete (RCC) or laced cement concrete 
(LRC). The composite walls are having the quality of 
attenuating the effects of close-in detonation. Composite walls 
3. TRIAL SET-UP
A three compartmented explosive storage structure 
named high performance magazine (HPM) was designed and 
constructed at the Test Range. It consists of three identical 
storage compartments having size 10 m x 8 m x 3.6 m each. 
Blast non-propagation composite walls comprising of sand 
filling and air gaps between LRC walls were constructed 
between two storage compartments. Two configurations 
of composite walls were used on either side of the central 
compartment. The first configuration comprised of sand (2m) 
- air (1m)-sand (2m) (S-A-S) while the second configuration 
was comprised of air (1m) -sand (3m) - air (1m) (A-S-A). 
Blast attenuation capabilities of both configurations were 
found comparable as per calculations & simulations and were 
needed to test experimentally for deciding better of the two. 
For this purpose, one compartment on either side of the central 
compartment was constructed incorporating both configurations 
(S-A-S and A-S-A). The central compartment was named as 
Donor Compartment as 5 T NEC HD 1.1 was to be initiated 
in that compartment during the Trial and the compartment 
was supposed to be sacrificed. Adjacent compartments on 
either side of the Donor Compartment were named Acceptor 
Compartments as the ammunitions kept in these compartments 
Figure 4. Attenuation of blast impulse in air.
Attenuation in blast impulse DI =I1-I2
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were supposed to be safe in case of accidental initiation of 5 
T NEC HD 1.1 in Donor Compartment. VIFTs (Vertical Inner 
Face Traverse) were constructed on both front and rear sides 
of the donor compartment for arresting the fragments /debris 
generated due to explosion. The layout of the experimental 
structure comprising of one Donor and two Acceptor chambers 
is shown in Fig. 6.
The actual test structure constructed at the Test Range to 
validate the design is as shown in Fig. 7.
To capture the real time structural response against blast 
load and to assess effect of blast up to OQD, numbers of 
sensors were deployed inside acceptor compartments as well as 
at various scaled distances in the field.  following parameters 
were measured during the blast field trial. figure 9 shows strain 
gauges deployed inside the acceptor compartments to capture 
the responses of the acceptor compartments against the blast 
load generated due to detonation of 5 T TNT inside the donor 
compartment.
Sensors like pressure probes, accelerometers and 
geophones were deployed in the field as shown in fig. 10 
for measuring overpressure, ground acceleration and 
ground peak particle velocity, respectively.
5. TRIAL RESULTS
 Both the acceptor compartments remained intact after 
the blast. Except the side wall of the acceptor compartments 
facing donor, all other walls including the acceptor roof 
remained intact and did not suffer any damage. The side wall 
facing donor sustained heavy damage but did not generate 
lethal fragments that could initiate an explosive stack. The 
reinforcement of the damaged side wall remained intact 
to the core concrete thereby proving the efficacy of LRC 
walls to take up huge deflections without failure. figure 11 
shows post trial photograph of the structure. The doors of both 
the acceptors remained intact and did not sustain any kind of 
damage.
Overpressure values, arrival time and positive duration of 
blast load measured at various quantity distances in the field 
are mentioned in Table 3.
Figure 8. Explosive stacked in HPM donor compartment.
Figure 6. Layout of trial set-up.
Figure 7. Test structure.    
4. DESIGN VALIDATION FIELD TRIAL
Fully instrumented blast trial with 5 Ton TNT was 
conducted successfully. 5 T of TNT was stacked in the central 
compartment (Donor) as per the stacking pattern. The stacking 
pattern has been finalised based on the series of detonability 
trials. The stacked TNT boxes in the Donor compartment 
are as shown in Fig. 8. Four numbers of fuzes, 10 kg plastic 
explosives, 10 electrical detonators and two anti-tank mines of 
6.8 kg NEC each were kept in both acceptor chambers. Figure 9. Deployment of sensors inside acceptor compartment.
Figure 10. Deployment of Sensors in the field.
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Table 3. Blast parameters at various quantity distances
Location Pressure recorded (Bar)
Arrival time
 (ms)
Positive 
duration (ms)
SIQD 1.18 75.6 32
PIQD 0.147 325 50
PTRD 0.065 628 56
OQD 0.04 980 60
QD reductions based on recorded overpressure were 
obtained by extrapolating the values of overpressure at various 
quantity distances on log-log plot. These reductions are as 
shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. QD reductions based on recorded overpressure
Quantity 
distances
Scaled 
distance
(STEC) (Z)
Scaled distance (Design 
validation trial) (Z)
Reduction
(per cent)
SIQD 2.4 1.85 28.0
PIQD 8 6.7 19.6
PTRD 14.8 11.8 25.0
OQD 22.2 20.1 10.4
These reductions in Q-Ds are in addition to the reduction 
due to decrease in maximum credible limit as shown in 
Table 2.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
For reducing PIQD and OQD, multi-compartmented 
explosive storage structures based on Unit Risk Principle is 
the solution. But the design of blast non-propagation wall 
between two adjacent compartments is a big challenge.  The 
blast non-propagation wall comprising of sand filling and air 
gap between LRC walls has been designed to withstand the 
blast effects of 5T neC HD 1.1. The design has been tested 
by full scale instrumented field trial.  Based on instruments 
readings, videography and visual observation, the design was 
validated. No sympathetic detonation occurred in the adjacent 
compartments. Ammunition/ explosives stored inside the 
adjacent compartments were found safe and serviceable. Out 
of the two proposed configurations of blast non-propagation 
wall, the Sand-Air-Sand configuration sustained less damage 
as compared to Air-Sand-Air configuration and hence has been 
recommended for the future design. The pressure recorded 
during the field trial at SIQD, PIQD, PTRD and OQD in all 
directions were substantially lower than the corresponding 
values for conventional explosive storage buildings. The 
reduction in QDs was directional and was over and above the 
reduction resulting from limitation of maximum credible event 
(MCE) to 5 T NEC per compartment. The number density of 
the lethal fragments at OQD was found lesser than its critical 
value (1 lethal fragment in 56 square metres). The en-masse 
detonation of 5 T NEC represents the worst case scenario with 
maximum blast, fragmentation and ground vibrations resulting 
in maximum possible damage to surrounding structures. In real 
scenario, where ammunition is stored in separate stacks, en-
masse detonation is a low probability event and thus the effects 
would be considerably less severe. 
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